Saturday, November 24, 2012

NATO between Leadership and Decline


Preface

 

 

The main reason for the existence and continuity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for 40 years is facing military threat by the Soviet Union the Socialist Warsaw Pact. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, NATO has been searching for new strategy or role to face challenges and threats of the post-Soviet world.

To reconsider NATO strategic concept, which was ratified in 1999, a working group composed of 12 experts was formed to provide the Secretary-General of NATO, former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen perception he can build on to modernize the Alliance's strategic concept commensurate with the challenges of the twenty-first century.

 

Despite the fact that Western Europe and United States are strategic allies, during Bush administration their relationship had experienced significant political divergence that reached the stage of tension in a number of hot topics, particularly the Middle East, following the events of U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which caused a split within the European House and in transatlantic relations. Add to that the recent differences over the strategy of remaining in Afghanistan under the deadly attacks NATO forces are facing there. Also, there is the issue of cuts in EU defense budgets that worries the United States to the extent that Washington warned NATO members that these cuts will affect the alliance global ambitions[1].

 

The main issue that overshadows NATO’s future can be summarized in the following question: is NATO still appropriate for the current stage, or is it just the remnants of an ancient Pact?

 

Perhaps politically it is easy to say: that NATO is still reliable. But assuming that the Alliance has the same importance which it had in the past with regard to the security needs of Member States, it will not survive long in the shadow of failure in Afghanistan and the consequent fall of many European Governments and under global operations that NATO launches outside its traditional geographic sphere against enemies who do not have armies, naval forces, or air forces.

Under the current economic crisis affecting most European countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and possibly Italy) the issue of defense is no longer the first concern of NATO members. Therefore, NATO should resolve its differences over internal conflicting strategic perceptions that make it very difficult to reach a consensus among its members. The absence of a vital threat that all NATO members agree up on (such as the former Soviet Union) hamper to a great extent reaching unanimity among member states as a prerequisite for NATO decisions.

 

NATO’s new strategic perception must deal with the situation in Afghanistan after withdrawal. There are a range of options for this new perception; the alliance could ignores the situation there, postpone making a decision about it, face it, or go around it.

The main argument behind postponing dealing with the situation in Afghanistan is that NATO must go beyond Afghanistan when looking at the future, but the problem with this option is that NATO has staked its future on success in Afghanistan. Thus, ignoring the situation there has uncertain consequences.

Another option that might not face considerable resistance is to go around the situation in Afghanistan in the sense that NATO only accepts the lessons learned from the conflict there as an input to form a new strategic perception, and then NATO abandons making global role a central issue of the safety and security of NATO countries.

It seems that NATO currently stands at crossroads; NATO could deal directly with challenges in conjunction with deep differences among members on the future of the alliance, and it is also possible to ignore all that.

None of the options could weaken the coalition or renew it. To resolve this dilemma, the strong leadership among the heads of the governments of the Member States is essential in order to ensure the appropriate approach. Unless the new strategic perception respond to these challenges and convince all members of its new role in the world, the Alliance will enter the stage of dissolution and turns into a mere relic of the past.


 

NATO between Leadership and Decline

 

The military role played by NATO in Afghanistan currently is considered hot topic by many observers and analysts. For the first time the Alliance which was founded in the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century to protect Western Europe from a Communist threat of the Soviet troops, go beyond the boundaries of  Europe to play a substantial military role in the mountains of Afghanistan. Indeed, the United States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban Government in late 2001 in the wake of September 11, 2001 attacks, but then it handed the bulk of military operations of the Allied Coalition forces in Afghanistan to NATO. Due to this role, NATO has suffered throughout 10 years of intense doubts on its role and purpose after the cold war. At the same time, the idea of NATO involvement in international conflicts outside the European continent was not easy, but the role of NATO in Afghanistan and talks about a role in Sudan's Darfur region, as well as in the Middle East refers to the success of the transition process in the Charter of the Alliance. Since that time, numerous analyses and reports discussed NATO's role in the post-cold war world order.

 

It seems that NATO reputation had risen after the fall of the regime of Qadhafi and allied forces assisted 17 February revolutionary movements to progress in various areas, in particular to enter Libyan capital of Tripoli. NATO’s operation in Libya intensified talks about the NATO’s new role of intervening to resolve international disputes in particular and in international relations generally. The military intervention of NATO forces were under international and Arabic legitimacy. It did not take the form of direct military intervention on the ground, but was due to UN Security Council delegation on the bases of the principle of humanitarian intervention. Consequently, this intervention attracted many debates in Arabic and international political circles about its legitimacy, its nature, and its usefulness.

 

            To perform a new role on the global stage, NATO must undergo many transformations. The first step in these transformations was the expansion of NATO’s membership to include countries from Eastern and Central Europe which were at one time a member of the Warsaw Pact. The Alliance believes that the expansion meets the following ends:

 

A. Establishing relationships with neighboring countries in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, these partners will share responsibility with NATO in maintaining the security of NATO countries and its geographical surroundings.

 

B-Establishing functional partnership with countries in Africa and Asia, especially that these partners have provided effective contributions to the Alliance, such as Japan (money), South Korea, Australia and Indonesia (troops and experts)

 

C. Establishing partnership with international organizations such as the United Nations and its institutions or with non-governmental organizations such as human rights commissions to contain disasters, genocides, and conflict resolution.

 

D. Expand the strategic concept to counter potential threats such as terrorism, the threat of maritime and energy security, Cyber wars, distortion of democratic values, the oppression of women, racial discrimination, and genocide.

 

E. NATO leaving operations in South America to the United States on the basis that it is considered its backyard.

 

F. Reaching an understanding with Russia and assuring them that NATO does not target its national security and its strategic deterrence forces and involving the Russians in the process of strategic deterrence, the fight against terrorism, crisis management, and especially after the mistrust of Russia's actions in Georgian-Russian war.

 

H. Concentrating on the great importance of war in Afghanistan, and working to end the war without NATO being defeated by withdrawing and leaving security tasks to Afghanis from 2011 to 2014.

 

The next step is reconsidering its strategic concept. There are many factors[2] that require considering when reassessing NATO’s strategic concept and role in the current circumstances including:

 

Firstly: there will always be the need for an international force to ensure security and stability. It is not expected that conflicts, massacres, or civil and inter-state wars that call for the intervention of the international community will seize to occur. There were many different projects that tried to deal with this reality, among which the proposal to organize “peace army”[3] under the leadership of the United Nations — the Security Council — to implement the decisions taken within the framework of maintaining peace and security. Strong opposition emerged from many States which considered that suggestion gives the United Nations leadership and sovereignty over all States of the world through combining legislative, executive, and judicial authorities in the hands of one institution that is supposed to be independent of all influences. Also the adoption of the United Nations Commissions on the processing and use of troops from countries willing to deal with a crisis such as African conflicts and Israeli- Arab wars were not always effective and successful models for dealing with crises.

 

Secondly:  the military structure of NATO, despite its success in some areas, has not been able to achieve decisive results in other areas, not because of weakness in NATO forces or lack of modern weaponry and advanced combat mechanisms, but because of unforeseen external factors. The most important issue facing the Alliance in the present circumstances is a question of developing the Alliance's military and political role.

 

Thirdly: there is no doubt that the evolution of NATO's role and the expansion of its operations to the entire world simply indicate the Alliance commitment to global stability, security, and peace; in short, it indicates the creation of a new world order. To do so require the United States and European Union to accept active participation in developing and supporting NATO not from the alliance members only, but all states who are eager to build a world of peace, security, and stability for all the nations on Earth including Russia and China of course. On the other hand, it will become mandatory on NATO members not to consider others participation in the alliance should be coupled with getting special privileges or illegal gains since such consideration would lead naturally to abort all sincere efforts to establish peace on firm foundations. Failure to specify precise and clear duties of the new Alliance will transfer current international conflicts inside NATO and destroy it.

 

Fourthly: the reorganization of NATO’s role and strategic concept to become globally and carries a new operations and new content lifts military burdens which many nations cannot bear, particularly in underdeveloped countries. It will become the duty of the new NATO to protect such nations.

 

Fifthly: NATO has unique abilities compared to other international organizations. NATO remains the most structured entity to undertake multilateral military operations aimed at keeping peace, and NATO is still the only player on the international stage so far.

 

 

NATO under the new strategy aims to turns into a global Alliance which scope includes the entire world and intervenes in all kinds of conflicts. In addition, NATO is trying to develop its combat doctrine and the equipment and training of forces, to establish Special Forces to intervene in crisis areas, to stimulate partners to support and aid the alliance, to initiated its operations through the United Nations, and NATO calls for restructuring to provide funds under the current global financial crisis

 

However, there are many current realities that tend to void NATO’s attempt to expand its global role. It seems that the U.S.-European strategic partnership through NATO started cracking as evident in acute remarks by U.S. officials against Europe as a unified bloc and against Europe as separate States.

Among the issue of conflict is NATO’s military spending on its activities and the lack of political will. The U.S. former Defense Minister Robert Gates criticized strongly the EU governments at a meeting of NATO in Brussels in June 2011 as he said that “the blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress — and in the American body politic writ large — to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense,”[4]. The U.S.-EU partnership which proved to be successful during the cold war no longer energetic and the European role in global affairs will be decline in the coming years if the attitude of EU states did not change to meet the twenty-first century challenges and demands.

According to Gates, European members’ behavior contributed to the marginalization of NATO’s role in the world. The reason behind this is not lack in European forces number in the Alliance, there are more than two million European soldier, but it relates to the extent of European spending on defense, as they declared significant cuts to defense budgets especially the UK, as well as the way EU forces are organize and the way in which the available funds are spent. Political and economic changes within Europe and within the United States confirm that the trans-Atlantic Alliance would lose its luster and reputation will continue to suffer. The United States itself has declined economically and no longer able to continue playing the role of world policeman and bear the expenses of global leadership. Therefore, Washington demands Europeans real participation in leadership burdens and not just relying on them as in the past.


Surviving the Afghani Legacy

 

NATO officials felt that the alliance transformation from European role to global role is not yet complete.  There are still a number of challenges awaiting NATO; challenges ranging from NATO capacity of rapid emergency intervention, to members efficiency and commitment to fulfilling their tasks and their financial obligations. Many observers show concerns about the growing demands and tasks of NATO that might hamper its transformation, especially since such demands exceed the actual capacity and potential of the Alliance.

 

During this month, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense of NATO held meeting in Brussels to discuss the future of NATO forces in Afghanistan, and plan the withdrawal of 130,000 troops over the next two years. The meeting came in preparation for the Summit hosted by President Barack Obama in the twentieth and the twenty-first of next month in Chicago. NATO leaders agreed in November 2010 to handover security tasks to Afghan forces gradually by the end of 2014, but they disagreed about how to finance the costs of the Afghan forces which will reach about four billion and 100 million dollars a year. NATO expects to increase the number of Afghan troops, reaching 352 thousand this year, but the number of these forces still under study in the future. Panetta said he worried constantly about the attacks because it indicates that the Taliban still enjoy flexibility and resolve.

 

In this month as well, four French soldiers were killed by Afghan soldiers trained served under NATO in Afghanistan. President Sarkozy froze military activity of French soldiers in Afghanistan, and reconsidered his country’s participation in ISAF forces. His resolution to leave the battle in Afghanistan would be problematic in terms of President Obama and perhaps also the first Domino's stone that falls in Western fragile presence on the territory of this country.

Generally, an early withdrawal will only serve Taliban. This is exactly what they want: the evacuation of foreign troops from Afghanistan, regains control of the country, and imposes extreme religious system, which affect human rights and women in particular. The problem is that nobody believes today that things will be better in Afghanistan after three years from now. In the best case, Afghanistan would be divided into regions under Taliban’s control and others under the rule of a corrupt and inefficient government.  In the worst case scenario, all of Afghanistan will be once again under the Taliban.

Nonetheless, early withdrawal from Afghanistan would ease the U.S. burden as well as relieve NATO. Obama’s approval rate will not suffer in election year, it is always useful to receive soldiers returning home marching on foot. Yet, no matter how beneficial the withdrawal will be to U.S. and NATO troops, someone will always say that the withdrawal was a successful result of the Taliban’s attrition war, and this would be inaccurate, but the price of this attrition after three years would be much more expensive.

 

NATO will come out of Afghanistan carrying seeds of vulnerability. The alliance failed to seriously engage in Afghanistan. In the agreed upon informal outline of the alliance, the United States is supposed to launch wars for freedom and then Europeans will take care of post-war nation building operations. But what happened in Afghanistan, is that Taliban took advantage of the U.S. full engagement in Iraq, and was able to return to the country again, putting NATO units in reactive position. NATO was forced to enter into the Afghani quagmire after the United States lifted its hands and reached the conviction that it will not be able to bring stability to Afghanistan alone, therefore, exerted pressure on NATO to be its substitute, despite the opposition of France and Germany for the troops involvement in this devastating task. The United States forced NATO to carry on its first military mission outside its geographic boundaries in a land and against a combat doctrine that were quite different from what the armies of member states were used to. Thus, NATO forces did not have an opportunity to do what they were supposed to do according to the agreed outline. NATO carried out its mission but in diverse method as was expected, especially after all governments of Alliance member countries selected different definitions of military units’ functions there. Some fought in battles like the Canadians, while others concentrated on building schools and training Afghani forces. NATO members felt they were sinking alone in the Afghani quicksand while U.S. troops were often geographically remote and isolated from the place where other NATO units operated. In addition, the U.S. forces were fully involved in chasing after the leader of the Al-Qaeda and other whom the former U.S. Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld likes to call the "bad guys".

 

The ISAF weakness was exemplified in member states evasion of fulfilling their combat tasks. British, Canadians, and Dutch soldiers suffered a lot in the bitter war in southern Afghanistan more than other states and French and German forces are reluctant to send troops to southern Afghanistan (the most dangerous of all regions). Member States did not respond efficiently to the demands of the Commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan in forming rapid intervention force of about 2,500 soldiers and providing combat equipment for the necessary protection of the soldiers.

 

Under such circumstances, Taliban forces regained strength with time and were capable of widening its popular support and expanding its relationships with strong regional opposition forces who disapproved of NATO and U.S. forces presence in Afghanistan. The Afghani government, on the other hand, was unable to earn the confidence and support of the people especially with the widespread of corruption which made NATO’s mission in responding to this corruption and fending the strong opposition very difficult. Furthermore, the military performance of NATO forces was not better than that of U.S. forces in not taking precautions to avoid killing innocent civilians, destroying their homes, or insulting their holy beliefs. Amnesty International has demanded a change in NATO's military conduct in Afghanistan, which is incompatible with the human rights organization. The organization criticized the bombing of populated areas and the destruction of houses by aircraft that caused an increased influx of refugees.

 

Summery

 

 

In general, conflicting views among NATO members (mainly U.S. verses EU) about the nature of global threats, the extent and mechanisms to face these threats, the limits of intervention, and Low military budgets of NATO all constitute obstacles in the way of NATO restructuring.

It was not wise to turn NATO forces (ISAF) that was formed in 2001 to maintain security in Kabul and assist in the reconstruction operations, into combat troops involved in bloody battles with significant number of civilian casualties. This made Afghans view NATO forces as invaders and made the Taliban in the eyes of the Afghan people a national liberation movement, regardless of their orientations. NATO failed to assist the Afghanis and convince them of the purpose of their presence and failed to fulfill its original purpose. Things are already getting harder day by day for NATO, and it cannot withdraw for the time being from the Afghani territory, because such decision will have devastating consequences on NATO as a whole and on its ambitions in playing a global role. The Way NATO managed war in Afghanistan will affect its future interventions as well as its reputation as strong and capable organization that will ensure global security and stability.

NATO Secretary General comments stressed that there will be no early withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and that the exit will be only after achieving the goals set by NATO although there are no features of those goals so far.

NATO is already the victim of the United States unilateral crusades, but will the alliance member states continue supporting their troops’ presence in Afghanistan and try as much as possible to succeed in their mission, or they will announce their mutiny soon, cut their losses and save their economies, accept their failure, retreat back to the comfort of their European continent and lick their wounds?



[1] Toby Vogel “Clinton warns Europeans against defense cuts”, EuropeanVoice.com, October 15, 2010
< http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/10/clinton-warns-europeans-against-defence-cuts/69190.aspx>
 
[2] Ernie Regehr, “NATO’s Strategic Concept, the NPT, and Global Zero”, briefing: Project Ploughshares, February 2010
< http://www.ploughshares.ca/sites/default/files/brf101.pdf>
[3] Matt Kohn, “The Peace Army”, The Huffington Post, November 29, 2010 < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-kohn/the-peace-army_b_789164.html>
 
[4] THOM SHANKER, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future”, the New York Times, June 10, 2011
< http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html>
 

The Prospects of U.S.-Turkish Strategic Cooperation In the Syrian Crisis


On Monday February 13th, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Turkish foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu held a press conference in Washington in which both accused the Syrian regime of escalating violence and using artillery against civilians. They also expressed their support for the proposal of sending Arab troops to Syria after the Arab League announced its intention to formally request the Security Council to send a joint peacekeeping force to Syria.
Hillary Clinton stressed that "Washington strongly supports the efforts of the Arab League initiative on Syria." She added that the United States is working with Turkey to address the humanitarian problems in the country, stressing that the two countries "are determined to allow materials to enter urgently" to Syria.

Clinton also confirmed that the United States is "eagerly" looking forward to join the "Friends of Syria" initiative. On his part, Davutoglu considered the meeting in Tunisia, scheduled on February 24th, to be "an important international platform to show our solidarity with the Syrian people and to send a strong and clear message, to the Syrian regime that it cannot continue repression". Clinton pointed out that it will work with her ​​Turkish counterpart to intensify diplomatic pressure on the Syrian regime and "to stop the campaign of violence", and noted that the tighten pressure will sanction targeted aspects[1].

 

According to the Turkish newspaper “Sabah”[2], which is very close to Recipe Tayyip Erdogan government, in an article published in the 16th of February: Ankara favors the establishment of «humanitarian corridor» to Syria from the Mediterranean and not from the Turkish territories, because the Turks are not enthusiastic about the idea of ​​opening their borders to serve as the «humanitarian corridor» due to the security risks shrouded in such an option, in addition to the fact that such decision needs the approval of the Turkish Parliament. However, this does not apply to humanitarian waterway (humanitarian waterways do not require the approval of the parliament). The newspaper justified Turkey's refusal to convert its borders with Syria to a «humanitarian corridor» that such step requires the approval of the Syrian government and that, of course, will never happen. Therefore, the newspaper deduced that military intervention should come next to the option of humanitarian corridor.

To elaborate more on Turkey’s position, the newspaper claimed that the Minister Ahmet Davutoglu discussed the idea of ​​ sea access to Syria with his U.S. counterpart Hillary Clinton during his visit to Washington. Upon return to Turkey, Davutoglu told reporters he hoped that obstacles impeding the application of the «humanitarian corridor» option will vanish without explaining the type of «corridor» they agreed (or did not agree) on and the nature of the so-called constraints. But, according to Turkish newspaper sources, the Turkish authorities believes that the best solution to the Syrian matter lies in establishing a « Naval humanitarian corridor» to Syria from the British military base in Cyprus.

In this context, the ​​«humanitarian corridor» option will be carried out under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which regulates the forms of foreign intervention for humanitarian purposes, despite the continued Russian and Chinese veto. On this subject, the newspaper mentioned that Ankara is still convinced that the UN's role is crucial in the Syrian crisis; therefore, Turkey intends to sponsor the “naval humanitarian corridor proceeding from the British base on the island of Cyprus” option at the “Friends of Syria” convention.
Davutoglu is expected to deliver a strong message to the Syrian regime at the Friends of Syria Conference, in parallel with his call for the United Nations to intervene to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people.
According to inside resources in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, during the Tunisian conference Turkey intends to suggest tightening diplomatic pressure on Damascus in conjunction with the establishment of humanitarian corridors[3].

 

Based on Davutoglu’s remarks in Washington and after he went back to Turkey, Ankara seems to be reluctant to interfere directly in Syria, whether by military or by humanitarian interventions-. Turkey is throwing the ball in the United States, the UN, and the NATO’s court.

There were many reasons behind Ankara’s behavior. The Turkish economic boom in the past decade is based mainly on exports. This boom made the Turkish economy the eighteenth in the world, and formed one of the most important causes behind the ruling Justice and Development (AKP) sequence electoral victories. Thus, the prolonged Syrian crisis and the economic sanctions are forcing the AKP government to search for alternative routes to Southern importing markets, including the Gulf markets, not to mention the Syrian market itself which constitute one of the most important commercial revenue sources for Turkey. Thus, in light of huge budget deficits and debt, undesirable consequences are forcing Turkey to carry out many calculations before embarking on political and military steps with a direct economic reflection on the export capacity.

 

Another reason for Ankara’s hesitation towards Syria is Iran. For the past few years, Ankara made sure to be friendly with Iran, as it appeared to be concerned with cooperation and coordination with the Iranians on many regional as well as bilateral issues especially issues stemming from the Iranian nuclear proliferation and Tehran problems with Western countries.

In fact, Ankara is forced to calculate the expense of the Iranian military power and the possibilities of sever Iranian reaction in case Turkey decided to go ahead with military intervention. The Turkish National Security Council[4] made a clear and decisive decision that the Turkish military will not intervene in Syria because it means Turkey will enter in a war with Iran and there is no need for Turkey to go to war with a country in the size of Iran. Despite the Council’s confidence in the Turkish armed forces capabilities and its Atlantic alliance, any involvement in war with Iran will not bring any benefit to the Turkish people. The Iranian decision to declare war on the Republic of Turkey to retaliate any Turkish intervention in Syria is not a maneuver, but is the decision of the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei, who recently sent one of the closest politicians to Syria to hold the post of ambassador there.
Iranians consider toppling the Syrian regime by foreign military forces as mere prelude to attacking Iran, so they are fully prepared to retaliate and defend their existence and they conveyed their position to Ankara and Washington. Therefore, institutions of the Turkish army will not allow the AKP to take the country into disaster; Turkey will not benefit anything at all.

 

Finally, there is a lot written recently about the Kurds and Syrians Alawites effect on Turkish internal stability and security. In this subject, we can easily notice that Syrian and Turkish domestic affairs intertwine especially in the shadow of the continuing war between Ankara and the "PKK" and the Turkish Alawites support to Turkey's secular parties against the "AKP", whether the left-wing parties or high rank officers in the army.
Syria can employ the Kurdish pressure on Turkey, and if it moved the Kurdish separatist movements in the south of Turkey, this can cause a severe internal instability that the AKP cannot afford and the reaction of the Turkish military might lead to unpredictable consequences internally and externally.

 

On the other side of the equation, the United States and the NATO do not want the ‘ball thrown by the Turks to their court’. According to Reuters, the Secretary General of NATOAnders Fogh Rasmussen’ declared on Friday, February 17 that the alliance will not provide technical assistance to ensure corridors for humanitarian aid to Syria. He also ruled out the possibility of NATO intervention in any way in Syria, stressing that a regional solution must be the framework to resolve the Syrian conflict. The NATO Secretary General expressed his conviction that the Syrian crisis cannot end except by achieving political changes designed to meet the democratic aspirations of the people. He said that the recurrence of the Libyan scenario in Syria is impossible, because "the structure of the Syrian society is different," and that it is "more complex from ethnic, political and religious perspectives".
These remarks Rasmussen made ​​during his visit to Ankara on the occasion of 60th anniversary of accepting Turkey in NATO[5]. This means that the NATO still wants Turkey to take the lead in any actions against the Syrian regime.

 

For President Barack Obama, the priority is to find a way to support the Syrian pro-democracy opposition forces, without feeding the conflict, which can be extended across the Middle East, knowing that Bashar al-Assad already threatened to ignite a horrific regional war if there is any military intervention in Syria in Davutoglu’s last visit. But how can the NATO and the United States avoid regional war and solve the Syrian crisis facing a rigid situation like this?

 

Washington knows that until last year Turkey was an ally to the Syrian regime, but it has emerged in recent months as one of the main competitors and opponents of al-Assad.

Turkey presented itself as one of the most important U.S. policy allies in the Middle East and the Caucasus on the bases of several considerations including:


• Turkey’s important role as a window to many regional axes and countries of particular importance to Washington, like Israel, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and its central role in the maintenance of stability in the belt extending from central Europe to the borders of India and Russia.
The strategic location of Turkey as a naval corridor that runs through the Black Sea, Caucasus and the Mediterranean.


Turkey as a corridor for reserve supply of oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe via a line (Jehan - Baku) as an alternative to the Russian line that extends across the Ukraine.


• U.S consideration of Turkey as a model for Muslim democracy that has a close alliance with the United States which may help in improving the U.S. image in the Middle East.

 

In this context, the United States considers Turkey a useful ally not only in Syrian issue but the entire Arab Spring and the Middle East. It seemed clear that the more involvement of Turkey in the files of the Middle East, the greater the United States demand its cooperation and partnership.
So, Turkey engaged in the Syrian crisis on behalf of the United States. The Turkish policy and scenarios in Syria were as follows: -

 

1 – Turkey’s attempts to direct and exploit so-called moderate Islamic groups such as the Brotherhood (whose Islamic model is the only one consider acceptable by the United States in the region because it is totally incompatible with the sectarian system on which the Syrian-Iranian Shiite alliance is built) who came to the political forefront in all the meetings held by the opposition. Turkey made a great effort to present them as the most influential political force in Syria.


2 – The Turkish efforts to pressure the Syrian regime in order to weaken it politically and economically both internally and externally. The Turkish declaration that it will tighten the screws on the Syrian regime economically came after the U.S. failure to pass a Security Council resolution to tighten the noose on Syria, which collided with the Russian-Chinese veto.


3 - Turkey’s efforts to control all possible scenarios and developments in the Syrian Revolution. While trying to weaken the Syrian regime politically and economically, Turkey is working on the other hand, to play the role of guardian of the opposition political parties through organizing numerous meetings, uniting them in one front, and establishing the Transitional Council that will lead any future change after the collapse of al-Assad regime.


4 - Harboring dissidents from the Syrian army who could become the basis of any military solution to the situation in Syria.


5 - in respect of any possible military intervention in Syria, at the beginning, Turkey was ready to play the role required of it on behalf of the United State who understood very well that any direct U.S. of NATO military intervention in Syria could be used by the Syrian regime to ignite the entire region in war without the possibility of determining or controlling the outcomes. It is a certainty that the possible military scenario in Syria will be creating a safe zone for refugees (humanitarian corridors) near the Turkish border in a specific depth inside Syrian territory, which might turn to springboard to launch attacks on the Syrian army . Such territories will be under the supervision of the Turkish army and the Turkish government and thus will ensure Turkey’s involvement in arranging the military and political scenes in Syria. It will also ensure the Turkish pressure on the opposition to weaken the expected political role of the Kurds in Syria after Bashar.

 

The United States has been so far cautious in approaching the Syrian crisis; the administration officials insist that the focus remains on supporting the Syrian people without stoking the conflict. Yet, the biggest disappointment of the United Sates from its Turkish ally is Ankara's failure to provide any concrete solutions to the situation in Syria or succeed in its attempts. Although we do not know much about the meetings’ content between Clinton and Davutoglu, but media sources indicated that the Turkish Foreign Minister has repeatedly shown floating and loose position. But despite the "sensitive" internal Turkish concerns about the latest developments in Syria, U.S. officials accuse their Turkish counterparts by “too many words and few deeds." In this context, it was revealed that Washington thought that it can depend on Ankara to provide the free Syrian army with logistics support to enhance its combat capabilities in the face of Assad forces. There are also leaks that the Defense Department made plans for military intervention in Syria, and Turkey would be in the forefront of the military campaign with the participation of Arab countries and the backup of the U.S. and Europeans. But Turkey has not shown enthusiasm for any military intervention in Syria due to the risks Ankara fears (which we mentioned earlier).

 

However, without the Turkish cooperation, any military intervention in Syria will be impossible. Syria is strongly backed by Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Russia, and China and if the last two continue to use their veto against Security Council decisions the situation will escalate and Turkey will have to lead the intervention to stop the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. This scenario is not far from becoming a reality.

 

 

 



[1] U.S. State Department "Remarks Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu After Their Meeting", Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State, Treaty Room, Washington, D.C, February 13, 2012 <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/183847.htm>
[2] SABAH, "Davutoglu and Clinton discuss solutions and delivering aid for Syria", February 14, 2012
 
[3]SABAH, "Davutoglu and Clinton discuss solutions and delivering aid for Syria", February 14, 2012
[4] Includes the President and the Prime Minister and Chief of Staff and commanders of maritime power, air and land in the Turkish armed forces

[5] See Rasmussen remarks at the following link: Reuters < http://www.reuters.com/video/2012/02/17/nato-chief-rules-out-syria-intervention?videoId=230353077&videoChannel=1>